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Abstract 
On 22 January 2013, French President François Hollande and 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel gathered in Berlin to 
celebrate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Élysée 
Treaty, the document that ended centuries of rivalry and 
warfare between their two countries. It is all too easy to forget 
the importance of Franco-German reconciliation. The 1950 
Schuman Declaration, which led to the creation of the European 
Union’s (EU) predecessor, the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC),  sought to render the prospect of war 
between France and Germany ‘not only unthinkable but 
materially impossible’. Over 60 years later, when the EU was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the Norwegian Nobel 
Committee noted that indeed, ‘war between Germany and 
France is unthinkable’. 
 
Halfway around the world in Asia, the other theatre of World 
War II, tensions between China and Japan have arisen, with 
Taiwan and South Korea also in the fray. Nationalist movements 
in these countries have grown. This background brief lays out 
the issues for a timely reappraisal of the applicability, or 
otherwise, of the European integration and reconciliation 
processes to East Asia. 
    
The brief seeks to outline the contours of the historic act of 
Franco-German reconciliation, and its consequences ever since. 
Starting from a brief look at the history of rivalry and war 
between the two countries, the brief examines the events 
leading to the signing of the Élysée Treaty in 1963, and the 
development of Franco-German exchanges that have cemented 
the relationship. Difficulties between the countries are also 
raised. A timescale analysis of the opinion of the two publics is 
considered, as a measure of the success of Franco-German 
reconciliation.  
 
Top: Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle, 22 
January 1963. PHOTO: French Ministry of Foreign 
and European Affairs.  
Bottom: Angela Merkel and François Hollande,  
22 January 2013. PHOTO: Getty Images. 
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50 years of the ‘twin engine’ 
Franco-German reconciliation, European 
integration and reflections for Asia  
 
 
LOKE HOE YEONG 1 
 
 
Introduction: Celebrations amid difficulties 
 
On 22 January 2013, French President François 
Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
gathered in Berlin to celebrate the 50th anniversary of 
the signing of the Élysée Treaty, the document that 
ended centuries of rivalry and warfare between their 
two countries. Amid the pomp, the current difficulties 
between the two leaders and their countries were 
momentarily forgotten – the differing strategies 
between the socialist Hollande and the pro-austerity 
Merkel in solving the euro zone debt crises, and 
France’s unilateral action in Mali, which put Germany in 
a bind with regard to its own military contribution. 
These disagreements prompted one journalist to write 
that ‘a chill has settled over the Rhine’.2  
 
It is all too easy to forget the importance of Franco-
German reconciliation. The common charge is that 
those generations of French and German citizens born 
after World War II take the peace between their 
countries for granted. The 1950 Schuman Declaration, 
which led to the creation of the European Union’s (EU) 
predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC),  sought to render the prospect of war between 
France and Germany ‘not only unthinkable but 
materially impossible’. Over 60 years later, the EU was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for the ‘advancement of 
peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights 
in Europe’, and the Norwegian Nobel Committee noted 
that indeed, ‘war between Germany and France is 
unthinkable’.3 
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Halfway around the world in Asia, the other theatre of 
World War II, tensions between China and Japan have 
arisen, with Taiwan and South Korea also in the fray. 
Centred on the disputes on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 
and Dokdo/Takeshima islets, it has led to various 
confrontations at sea, and worrying escalations with 
jets being scrambled on a number of occasions.  
Nationalist movements in these countries have grown. 
The charge often levelled at Japan is that it has not fully 
‘learnt’ from Germany in dealing with its war past. 
Besides bearing in mind that the situation in Asia 
cannot be simplistically compared to Europe, one has 
to be careful that applying the ‘lessons’ of Germany 
may actually backfire. For instance, the scholar Jennifer 
Lind has warned that apologies issued by the Japanese 
government on its wartime conduct can and indeed 
have led to serious backlashes from nationalistic 
elements back home.4  
 
The prudent way forward therefore is for Asians serious 
about pursuing a peace agenda to examine the 
European case in greater detail, and reflect on what can 
and need to be done to confront Asia’s own histories in 
order to move forward with reconciliation.  
 
This background brief seeks to outline the contours of 
the historic act of Franco-German reconciliation, and its 
consequences ever since. Starting from a brief look at 
the history of rivalry and war between the two 
countries, the brief examines the events leading to the 
signing of the Élysée Treaty in 1963, and the 
development of Franco-German exchanges that have 
cemented the relationship. Difficulties between the 
countries are also raised. A timescale analysis of the 
opinion of the two publics is considered, as a measure 
of the success of Franco-German reconciliation.  
 
 
The concept of reconciliation 
 
Germany has had no comprehensive or overarching 
policy of reconciliation with its former enemies or 
victims of the Nazi era. This has not prevented 
successive German governments and their officials 
from being remarkably consistent in their foreign policy 
articulations over the years. The Christian Democrat 
chancellor Helmut Kohl said ‘we want to realise the 
aims that Adenauer declared as the principle objectives 
                                                                                            
<http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2
012/press.html>    
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of foreign policy in 1949; understanding and 
reconciliation, particularly with France, Israel and 
Poland’,5 while the Social Democratic-Green coalition 
agreement of the Gerhard Schröder government 
declared that ‘German foreign policy is peace policy’ 
and its commitment to ‘good neighbourliness and 
historic responsibility’.6     
 
As pointed out by Feldman, German policies towards 
reconciliation reflect the meanings of both the German 
equivalents of the word – versöhnung, which implies a 
philosophical/emotional aspect, and aussöhnung, 
which conveys a practical/material element.7  
 
The scholar Ulrich Krotz has drawn attention to the 
‘parapublic’ underpinning of Franco-German relations, 
which describe state-organised and -financed 
interactions between private individuals or collective 
actors.8 ‘Parapublic’ interactions, for Krotz, have been a 
very important process of Europeanisation that is 
independent of European Union-led initiatives.     
 
 
The history of Franco-German rivalry  
 
Emergence of France and Germany as national entities 
can be traced to the Treaty of Verdun of A.D. 843 when 
the empire of Charlemagne was divided between three 
of his heirs – the third entity from this division 
corresponds to the territory stretching from today’s 
Netherlands, through the French provinces of Alsace, 
Lorraine, Burgundy and Provence, to northern Italy. In 
successive centuries, there had been hostilities 
between the French and German proto-entities and 
their sub-entities.  
 
However, it would only be meaningful to speak of the 
beginning of Franco-German rivalry in the modern age 
of nationalism after the Napoleonic wars, which ended 
in 1815. The kingdom of Prussia gradually became the 
                                                     
5
 Speech by the Federal Chancellor to the Chicago Council on 
Foreign Relations, Chicago, 19 June 1997. Bulletin, Presse- 
und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung no. 63, 30 July 
1997. 751.  
6
 Cited in Feldman, Lily Gardner. 1999. ‘The principle and 
practice of ‘reconciliation’ in German foreign policy: relations 
with France, Israel, Poland and the Czech Republic’. 
International Affairs, 75:2. 333.  
7
 Ibid. 334.   
8
 Krotz, Ulrich. 2007. ‘Parapublic Underpinnings of 
International Relations: The Franco-German Construction of 
Europeanization of a Particular Kind’. European Journal of 
International Relations, 13: 3. 385-417.  
most powerful of the German states, and its Minister-
President Otto von Bismarck led the unification of 
Germany to become the first German Chancellor. The 
German Empire came into being in 1871, following 
Prussia’s defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian war. 
France was forced to cede the territories of Alsace and 
Lorraine, and to pay an indemnity of five billion francs 
to the German Empire. Thereafter, the ideas of 
‘hereditary enmity’ (Erbfeindschaft in German) and of 
l’esprit de revanche (‘desire for revenge’) in France 
were born.  
 
France and Germany went to war again, when the 
countries of the Central Powers (comprising Germany 
and Austria-Hungary) and the Allies (comprising France, 
Britain and Russia, based on the Triple Entente) were 
drawn into battles culminating in World War I. 
Defeated by the Allies, Germany was forced to return 
Alsace-Lorraine to France, and to pay reparations 
amounting to 132 billion gold marks. The German 
territories of the Saar and the Ruhr were occupied by 
French troops slightly later, when Germany failed to 
pay war reparations, as provided for by the Treaty of 
Versailles.  
 
Adolf Hitler and the Nazis came into power in Germany 
in 1933 on a revisionist platform. Starting with large 
scale rearmament to the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
and Poland, World War II descended upon Europe. 
Germany invaded France in 1940, occupying it for four 
years. Upon Germany’s unconditional surrender in May 
1945, the country was divided into four zones of 
occupation by the Allies – the United States, Britain, 
France and the Soviet Union.  
 
 
Post-World War II settlements  
 
Understandably, France remained distrustful of its 
eastern neighbour after World War II – it was, after all, 
the third war in a century with Germany. France’s post-
war foreign policy was designed to keep German 
resurgence under control. Nonetheless, the French 
were also cognisant of not punishing Germany ‘till the 
pips squeaked’,9 as they did at Versailles after World 
War I.  
 
France was again concerned about the Saar and the 
Ruhr territories, where the coal and steel industries of 
Germany were centred. The French wanted these 
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industries and their host territories to be controlled 
internationally, as they wanted to limit Germany’s 
industrial and war capacities. Giving in to French 
demands in their Monnet Plan, the US allowed the Saar 
to be made a protectorate of France. It was not until 
French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Robert 
Schuman’s proposal for the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) in 1950 that France started to turn 
away from a policy of permanent occupation of parts of 
German territory. The Saar was returned to West 
Germany in 1957 after a local referendum, although 
France retained its economic right to the Saar coal 
mines until 1981. The Ruhr was run by an international 
authority chaired by the Allied powers until 1952. 
 
France soon cooperated more fully with the British and 
the Americans, and the three western zones of 
occupation merged – first in 1948 as an entity using the 
common reformed currency of the Deutschmark, and 
eventually in 1949 as the Federal Republic of Germany 
(West Germany) with partial sovereignty. With the Cold 
War raging, the US pushed for the rearmament of 
Germany, agreeing through the 1951 Bonn Conventions 
to grant West Germany full sovereignty. The French 
National Assembly voted this plan down, as well as the 
European Defence Community (EDC) treaty, fearing a 
threat to French national sovereignty. An alternative 
framework with slight tweaking of some provisions was 
then offered through the 1954 Paris Agreements. With 
the termination of the Allied occupation of Germany 
through the Paris Agreements, West Germany attained 
full sovereignty in 1955, with its integration into 
Western Europe guaranteed through its full 
membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the Brussels Pact.   
 
 
Élysée Treaty, 1963  
 
The opportunity to attain a new level of reconciliation 
between France and Germany came in September 1958, 
when West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer met 
French President Charles de Gaulle for the first time. 
While Adenauer had been chancellor since the 
establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany 
(West Germany) in 1949, de Gaulle was in the process 
of returning to power in France after a 12-year hiatus. 
In the constitution of the French Fifth Republic that was 
being drafted in 1958, the president was to be given 
greater executive powers. Ostensibly, this gave de 
Gaulle greater prerogative in foreign policy than the 
preceding head of government of France, the prime 
minister of the Fourth Republic.  
 
After several meetings, the friendship between the two 
leaders culminated in their signing of the Élysée Treaty 
(also known as the ‘Treaty of Friendship’) on 22 January 
1963. The treaty document was a brief one, outlining 
the general areas of Franco-German cooperation for 
the future. Nonetheless, the vision of the treaty was 
realised in very real terms in the ensuing 50 years.  
 
Treaty provisions 
 
The treaty provided for the leaders of the two countries 
to meet at least twice a year. More frequent meetings 
were envisaged for the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Minsters of Defence, ministers-in-charge of youth 
affairs, and government officials. An inter-ministerial 
commission, to be created in each of the countries, 
would be charged with monitoring cooperation 
between the two governments. 
 
On important issues of foreign affairs, the two 
governments undertook to consult each other before 
making decisions. On Defence issues, exchanges of 
personnel and a harmonisation of strategic doctrines 
were provided for.  
 
The third area for Franco-German cooperation was on 
education and youth issues. The two governments 
sought to promote instruction for students in the 
languages of each other’s country. Academic terms and 
qualifications in the two countries were to be better 
synchronised. A body supported by a joint fund would 
be created to facilitate exchanges between French and 
German youths, including artists and workers. 
Cooperation between scientific and research institutes 
would increase their contacts across the border 
through cooperation.  
 
The immediate development - Franco-German Office for 
Youth  
 
The Franco-German Office for Youth (L'Office franco-
allemand pour la jeunesse in French, Deutsch-
Französisches Jugendwerk in German), perhaps the 
most enduring product of the treaty, was established in 
summer that same year the treaty was signed. An 
organisation presided over by the ministers for youth 
affairs of both countries, it has facilitated the 
participation of 8 million French and German youths in 
various exchange programmes in each other’s country 
since its inception.10  
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EUC Background Brief No. 8  
 
 5 
The document that established the Office, the 
Intergovernmental Agreement of 5 July 1963, stated 
that its purpose is to ‘tighten the bonds between young 
people in both countries, to strengthen their mutual 
understanding and, to this effect, to provoke, 
encourage and, where necessary, to set up encounters 
and exchanges between young people’.11 
 
The Office partners with different organisations to 
encourage interest in intercultural awareness, as well 
as to facilitate vocational training, and covers 
exchanges of students from the primary to university 
level.  
 
 
Franco-German exchanges over the years 
 
Personal relationships of the leaders 
 
The Élysée Treaty institutionalised the relationship of 
leaders of France and Germany, by providing for them 
to meet regularly. This led the way for successive 
leaders of the two countries to forge a kind of personal 
relationship rarely seen among politicians – one thinks 
of Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle; Willy Brandt 
and Georges Pompidou; Helmut Schmidt and Valéry 
Giscard d'Estaing; Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand; 
and Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac.  
 
The symbolism of such closely-knitted relationships 
between national leaders is in itself powerful enough as 
evidence of genuine reconciliation. The image of 
Mitterrand and Kohl holding hands in 1984 at the site 
of the Battle of Verdun of World War I has attained 
iconic status. More recently, Angela Merkel and 
Nicholas Sarkozy, while having earned the not-so-
flattering sobriquet of the ‘Merkozy duet’, is 
nonetheless a reflection of the continued perception of 
the importance of the Franco-German partnership in 
European affairs.  
 
 
Religious and civil society groups  
 
Religious leaders in both countries re-established 
contact early on after the end of World War II, tapping 
on Christian teachings on forgiveness to foster 
reconciliation between countries. The relationship 
between Konrad Adenauer and Robert Schuman, the 
latter in his role as an early post-war prime minister of 
France, has been characterised as ‘Roman Catholic 
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interaction’. 12  Indeed, both men were devoutly 
religious. In 1962, a landmark Mass of Reconciliation 
was held in Reims Cathedral, where the kings of France 
once were crowned, with de Gaulle and Adenauer in 
attendance.   
 
Interactions between religious and civil society leaders 
were not confined to the Roman Catholic Church. As 
early as 1946, the French Protestant church 
participated in the synod at Speyer, Germany. That 
same year, the non-governmental organisation Moral 
Re-Armament (known today as Initiatives of Change 
International) started inviting German and French 
political, religious and civil society leaders to its 
conference centre in Caux, Switzerland. The German 
delegation was initially treated coldly by the other 
conference delegates. 13  But through further 
conferences in subsequent years, Moral Re-Armament 
played a key role in reconciling French and German 
leaders from the political, religious and civil spheres, at 
a time when the international contact with German 
figures was very limited. One of these conference 
delegates was Konrad Adenauer, before he became the 
German chancellor, when he was in the process of 
building up the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party.   
 
 
Town twinning 
  
While schemes to twin towns from different countries 
already existed in Europe before World War II, the 
Élysée Treaty certainly paved the way for more, and 
extended the concept to schools and regions in France 
and Germany. Besides complementing youth exchange 
programmes, economic and touristic exchanges also 
proliferated from the twinning schemes. 
 
 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung (‘Coming to terms with the 
past’) 
 
While it derived its intellectual basis from the 
philosophical and cultural spheres, the concept of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung has had a very real 
application in the everyday lives of Germans. It has 
been most conspicuous in the practices of Holocaust 
remembrance – in the building of Holocaust memorials, 
through the school history curriculum, laws against 
Holocaust denial, and reparations and frequent 
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apologies made by German leaders to the Jewish 
people and the state of Israel. 
 
It has also been applied to Franco-German relations, as 
part of a broader act of Germans coming to terms with 
the atrocities committed by the Third Reich. While 
apologies and other acts of contrition offered by 
German officials were largely addressed to the Jewish 
people, due to the overwhelming extent of suffering 
from the Holocaust, the French were highly attuned to 
them. What the French valued most, though, were not 
apologies or war crimes trials, but the revision of 
history education in Germany. They felt that ‘books and 
syllabus must be fundamentally revised, not only from 
the angle of de-Nazification, but also from all traces of 
an aggressive spirit’.14 During the period of post-war 
Allied occupation of Germany, the French took the 
issue of education in Germany seriously. Hearnden 
noted that ‘of the three Western allies, it was the 
French who approached the “re-education” issue with 
the greatest precision… policies were adopted 
somewhat in the spirit of a mission civilisatrice, 
designed in this case to awaken in the Germans a love 
of freedom and individualism as revealed in French 
cultural traditions’.15 
 
But the concept of Vergangenheitsbewältigung had yet 
to sink into the German psyche at this point of time. 
Until the 1960s, Germany pursued what Lind calls an 
‘Adenauer model’, in which it acknowledged war time 
atrocities while emphasising its post-war achievements. 
The then recent war was largely glossed over in 
textbooks in which, according to Richard Evans, ‘very 
little was said about Nazism. Next to nothing was 
taught in schools… critical enquiry into the German past 
was discouraged’. 16  The emphasis was on German 
victims of Nazism, such as those from the resistance 
movements. Nonetheless the German government did 
pay huge amounts of reparations, especially to the 
state of Israel.  
 
It was only in the late 1960s, when the Social 
Democrats came into power in Germany, that German 
                                                     
14
 Helen Liddell, quoting a 1947 manuscript by Marek St-
Korowicz, as cited in Lind, Jennifer. 2003. ‘Apologies and 
Threat Reduction in Postwar Europe’ (manuscript). Paper 
prepared for delivery at the Memory of Violence Workshop, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 24-25 January 2003. 
27. <web.mit.edu/rpeters/papers/lind_apologies.pdf>  
15
 Hearnden, Arthur. 1974. Education in the Two Germanies. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 37.  
16
 Evans, Richard J. 1989. In Hitler's Shadow: West German 
Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past. 
New York: Pantheon Books. 11.  
atrocities committed during World War II were 
earnestly explored. Official German statements relating 
to the war also became markedly more apologetic. As 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung began to sink in, former 
concentration camps started to be memorialised, and 
history education was revamped to reflect an 
apologetic remembrance of Nazi crimes in greater 
detail.  
 
According to Lind, Christian Democrat conservative 
politicians have been careful not to be overly 
apologetic  of the German past, and steered the 
country back to the ‘Adenauer model’ when they 
returned to power in 1982. This apparently stemmed 
from their fear of the far right who could then offer 
Germans a ‘prouder version of history’.17 Conservative 
politicians in the 1980s told Germans to ‘walk tall again’ 
and to ‘come out of Hitler’s shadow’.18  
 
Nonetheless, German leaders continue to make 
statements of apologies to this day. For their part, the 
French have not shied away either. In 1995, Jacques 
Chirac became the first French president to apologise 
for French complicity in the Holocaust during the Vichy 
regime which collaborated with Nazi Germany.19  
 
 
A joint history textbook - Histoire/Geschichte20  
 
In 2006, a history textbook for secondary school 
students jointly written by French and German 
historians, titled ‘Histoire/Geschichte’ (‘history’ in 
French and German) was published for the first time. It 
covered the history of both countries and of Europe 
after 1945. Hailed as the first such joint history 
textbook by any two countries, it was published 
simultaneously in the two languages and approved for 
use by the education authorities in France and in all the 
16 federal states of Germany.   
 
Already in the late 1940s, historians and educators 
from both countries had been convening to discuss 
textbook revisions. But the idea of jointly producing 
and implementing a history textbook was only mooted 
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 Franz Josef Strauss and Alfred Dregger, quoted in ibid.  
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 Ganley, Elaine. 1995. ‘Chirac: France's Apology To Jews’. 
The Seattle Times, 17 July 1995. 
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 Nathan/Ernst Klett (website). ‘Histoire Geschichte: 
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franco-allemand’. 
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by the young participants at the 2003 Franco-German 
Youth Parliament meeting, incidentally on the 40th 
anniversary of the signing of the Élysée Treaty. The idea 
was taken up by the German Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs and the French Ministry of Education. 
 
The project of authoring the textbook was not without 
contentions. One concerned the depiction of the 
United States, seen as a great power rival in France but 
more as a ‘rebuilder’ of Europe in Germany. Another 
concerned Communism, which has been an important 
movement in French political history, but is associated 
with the East German and Soviet dictatorships in 
Germany. These differences, according to the authors, 
have been carefully explained in the final product of the 
textbook.   
 
Other differences were of a more light-hearted nature. 
It was noted in the course of the venture that German 
textbooks have tended to be wordy while their French 
equivalents have been more akin to glossy magazines 
with generous illustration. The final joint product went 
with the latter style.  
 
A second volume covering the period from 1815 to 
1945, an arguably thornier period to deal with, was 
published in 2008. Consequently the idea of joint 
history textbooks was also mooted for Germany and 
Poland, and for Slovakia and Hungary.  
 
 
A Franco-German cultural TV-channel – ARTE 
 
In 1992, the Franco-German public-service cultural 
television channel ARTE (Association Relative à la 
Télévision Européenne) went on air. The first time a 
television channel had been created for two audiences, 
Mitterrand and Kohl sought to ‘bring French and 
German citizens closer on a cultural level and promote 
cultural integration throughout Europe’. 21  An 
agreement between the two governments was signed. 
Headquartered in Strasbourg, there are two more 
entities of ARTE, in Paris and Baden-Baden, responsible 
for programme production. Documentaries are the 
mainstay of ARTE, though the genres of films, 
information programmes and music, theatre and dance 
programmes are also well covered. Besides options 
available for subtitling and dubbing when receiving the 
channel, hosts also speak both French and German in 
alternation.  
                                                     
21
 ARTE (website). ‘The ARTE Group’. 
 <http://www.arte.tv/de/arte-the-channel-
engl/2197470.html>  
The Franco-German Brigade, Eurocorps and security 
cooperation 
 
In 1987, the Franco-German Brigade22 was formed after 
a decision made at a summit between Mitterrand and 
Kohl. A brigade of currently 6,000 soldiers, it consists of 
an armoured reconnaissance regiment an artillery 
regiment and three infantry battalions from both 
countries and stationed in various towns. Its 
headquarters in Mülheim, Germany, and its logistical 
support unit are staffed binationally. When the 
multilateral army Eurocorps23 was formed in 1992 with 
the participation of France, Germany, Belgium, 
Luxembourg and Spain, the Franco-German Brigade 
was integrated into it as its nucleus. Besides joint 
military exercises, the brigade has been notably 
deployed as a peacekeeping mission to Kosovo in 2000, 
among others.  
 
Consultations on security issues between France and 
Germany were also further institutionalised around this 
time. In 1988, the Franco-German Defence Council was 
set up. These interactions between Paris and Bonn led 
to the formulation of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) in the Maastricht Treaty creating the EU. 
 
 
Difficulties in Franco-German relations 
 
The historian Feldman wrote that ‘reconciliation is a 
long and difficult process’. She noted that even 
Adenauer had said, in reference to the Élysée Treaty, 
that ‘this friendship between France and Germany is 
like a rose that will always have buds and flowers,’ and, 
he added, ‘thorns’. 24  Any study of Franco-German 
reconciliation, therefore, should not shy away from 
discussing difficulties in the bilateral relationship. 
 
Even during the course of ratifying the Élysée Treaty, 
the Germans ruffled Charles de Gaulle when German 
lawmakers inserted a preamble into the document 
reaffirming West Germany’s commitment to NATO and 
its defence ties with the United States. De Gaulle, who 
had separately been protesting against the strong role 
of the US in NATO, was reportedly enraged and hinted 
                                                     
22
 Franco-German Bridge (website).  
<http://www.df-brigade.de>   
23
 Eurocorps (website). <http://www.eurocorps.org/>   
24
 Passeron, André. 1966. De Gaulle Parle 1962-1966. Paris: 
Fayard. 341. 
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that the treaty could become a dead letter.25 In 1966, 
under separate circumstances, de Gaulle withdrew 
France from the NATO military command. That raised 
the question of how French troops could be allowed to 
remain on German soil after being transferred from 
NATO command, which was the post-war agreement, 
to French national control. Despite this awkward 
situation potentially raising issues on German’s security 
and sovereignty, Germany ultimately consented to 
French troops remaining.  
 
Over the years, relations between France and Germany 
in the European Economic Community (EEC) was 
occasionally tense on issues of agricultural subsidies, 
monetary coordination, and the French initial rejection 
of Britain’s membership of the community. Germany 
was also not pleased during the ‘empty chair crisis’ of 
1965-6 when France temporarily withdrew its 
representative from the EEC’s Council of Ministers in 
protest over its veto rights on new European 
Commission proposals. It did not help that Adenauer’s 
successor as chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, was nowhere 
as sympathetic to French interests as his predecessor 
was.  
 
Despite all that the Élysée Treaty provided for, and the 
years of regular meetings at the political level, the 
increasing prospect of German reunification in the late 
1980s was still viewed with trepidation by many of the 
French elites. Mitterrand had confided his fears with 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who later 
revealed that Mitterrand was ‘clearly irked by German 
attitudes and behaviour… but was at a loss as to what 
he could do’.26 He sought assurances from the reunified 
Germany as to its future military behaviour and to 
renounce any nuclear weapons capability. A French 
journalist wrote at this time that ‘when Germany 
becomes larger, it is inevitable that this evokes the 
phantom of a grand Germany whose ambition spilled 
blood in crimes across Europe’.27  
 
 
Public opinion and attitudes  
 
Perhaps the best vindication of the policies of Franco-
German reconciliation has been in the dramatic 
                                                     
25
 De Menil, Lois Pattison. 1977.  Who Speaks for Europe? 
The vision of Charles de Gaulle. London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, London. 125 
26
 Thatcher, Margaret. 1993. The Downing Street Years. 
London: HarperCollins. 797 
27
 Frappat, Bruno. 1990. ‘Puissants voisins’. Le Monde, 13 
October 1990.   
reversal in public opinion. As the German-French 
scholar Alfred Grosser pithily put it,28 the French view in 
1944 was that there was ‘no enemy but Germany’, but 
by 1960 that view had changed to ‘no friend but 
Germany’. In a poll conducted in 1950 asking French 
respondents to rank various countries in order of 
preference, Germany came out in last place, behind the 
Soviet Union.29 In 1965, West Germany garnered 20 per 
cent of votes in a poll to earn the place of being 
France’s best friend.30 That figure grew to 48 per cent in 
a 1983 poll.31   
 
In a study on integration between France and Germany 
at various levels by Puchala,32 the mid-1950s to the 
early 1960s was identified as the period during which 
the greatest improvement in mutual perceptions at the 
people-to-people level occurred. It might be noted that 
this corresponds to the period immediately preceding 
the signing of the Élysée Treaty. This suggests the 
provisions of the treaty cemented and institutionalised 
whatever goodwill at the people-to-people had already 
been built up through projects of European integration 
starting with the establishment of the ECSC.  
 
French attitudes towards German reunification have 
been slightly more mixed, but generally positive. The 
support of the French public for German reunification 
has been steadily growing. In 1960, only 33 per cent of 
them supported German reunification, growing to 62 
per cent in 1987.33 In a poll conducted in France in 
October 1990 when Germany was officially reunified, 
only 37 per cent of respondents ‘rejoiced about 
[German] unification’.34 It was noted, though, that the 
figure was 55 per cent among young people in the 18 to 
25 age bracket. But it was the French elites who were 
more uncertain, even alarmed. American negotiators 
observed that French leaders ‘will consider raising the 
question of the unity of Germany as extremely 
                                                     
28
 Grosser, Alfred. 1967, French policies under de Gaulle. 
London: Little, Brown. 6. 
29
 Stoetzel, Jean. 1957. ‘The Evolution of French Opinion’. In 
France Defeats EDC, edited by 
Lerner, D. and R. Aron. New York: Praeger. 74.   
30
 Poll by Institut Français d’Opinion Publique, published in 
France Soir, 18 March 1965. 
31
 Poll, ‘L’image compareé de la France et l’Allemagne de 
l’Ouest’, SOFRES (May 1983). 1. 
32
 Puchala, Donald J. 1970. ‘Integration and Disintegration in 
Franco-German Relations, 1954–1965’. International 
Organization, 24. 183-208.   
33
 Sondages, no. 3 (1960), p. 71; ‘La Reunification 
Allemande?’ Geopolitique (1987). 6-9.  
34
 SOFRES. L’etat de l’opinion 1991. Paris: Seuil.   
EUC Background Brief No. 8  
 
 9 
explosive’.35 Mitterrand’s fears of German reunification, 
as confided to Margaret Thatcher has already been 
noted above.  
 
French analysts and scholars believe that Germany’s 
participation in European integration has been the key 
towards reversing French perceptions of their country 
as a threat.36 In this vein, one of them has commented 
that ‘the EU has changed everything’.37  
 
 
European integration and the ‘twin engine’  
 
The post-war Franco-German relationship has often 
been described as the ‘twin engine’ that has been the 
driving force behind European integration. In 
theoretical debates, scholars argue that regional 
integration mitigates violent conflict between states for 
two main reasons – economic interdependence, which 
makes it irrationally costly for them to go to war, and 
the phenomenon of information sharing, which 
facilitates the peaceful resolution of disputes.  
 
To achieve peace on the European continent after 
World War II, the link between the need for 
reconciliation between France and Germany and for 
integration in Europe was made early on. In 1946, 
Winston Churchill said that ‘the first step in the re-
creation of the European family must be a partnership 
between France and Germany’.38  
 
One prior form of the ‘European family’ was the 
Concert of Europe system that existed from 1815 to 
World War I. Based on the balance of power, it was a 
form of collective conflict-solving mechanism, albeit a 
flawed one that led to an arms race on the eve of 
World War I. Currency unions were not alien to the 
continent either. The Zollverein (German customs union) 
established in 1818 was a successful early venture in 
economic integration, although it was intended for the 
unification of the German states. Ideas for a European 
federation were raised as early as the 17th century by 
the mathematician and philosopher Gottfried Leibniz.   
 
 
                                                     
35
 Zelikow, Philip, and Condoleezza Rice. 1995. Germany 
Unified and Europe Transformed: a Study in Statecraft. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 88.  
36
 Interviews conducted by and cited in Lind. 2003. 45.  
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Churchill Society, London (website). ‘Winston Churchill 
speaking in Zurich, I9th September 1946’.  
<http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/astonish.html>   
European integration in the 1950s 
 
The 1950 Schuman Plan, which led to the creation of 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), is 
remembered today for its lofty language and its 
symbolism of the birth of modern European integration 
that has resulted in today’s European Union. The date 
on which the proposal was announced as the Schuman 
Declaration, 9 May 1950, is marked today as Europe 
Day. But in some quarters in France, such as those 
pushing for French control over the Ruhr, the plan was 
lent support as an ‘attempt to shackle German heavy 
industry’,39 although that aim itself was not fulfilled. As 
mentioned above, France was primarily preoccupied 
with putting the Ruhr and the Saar territories of 
Germany under French or international supervision. 
The Schuman declaration sought to place the coal and 
steel sectors under a supranational authority as the 
starting point to make war ‘materially impossible’ 
between member states. 
 
Through the negotiations following the Schuman 
Declaration, the French and German delegations made 
mutual compromises in realising the ECSC. Four other 
countries – Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg – were also involved in the negotiations, 
and subsequently became the six founding member 
states.  
 
Following the establishment of the ECSC, the idea of a 
European Defence Community (EDC) was mooted by 
the French prime minister as a pan-European defence 
force. It was voted down in the French National 
Assembly as an unacceptable loss of French national 
sovereignty and hence abandoned, though the treaty 
was already ratified by the other ECSC member states. 
Nevertheless, there was support later for the European 
Economic Community (EEC) which was created by the 
1957 Treaty of Rome, as a further means of broadening 
and deepening economic integration through a 
common market. A separate and legally distinct 
institution, the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) which dealt specially with the European 
market for nuclear power, was also formed 
concurrently.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
39
 Lovett, A. W. 1996. ‘The United States and the Schuman 
Plan. A Study in French Diplomacy 1950-1952’. The Historical 
Journal, 39: 2. 455.  
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Monetary union 
 
In the 1970s, after the Bretton Woods international 
monetary system ended, the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) was set up to fix currency exchange 
rate margins to reduce variability. By 1988, discussions 
on creating a monetary union were in full steam. Once 
again, France and Germany were at the centre of the 
negotiations for an Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), providing an ‘inner negotiation within the wider 
EMU negotiations’.40 This was very much a reaction to 
Germany’s impending reunification. The negotiations 
were not entirely smooth sailing, as rival versions of a 
‘French model’ – emphasising democratic legitimation 
of economic and monetary policy – and a ‘German 
Bundesbank model’ – in which the independence of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) was paramount – of the 
EMU were thrashed out.  
 
Despite these differences, what was not in doubt was 
that the French and German negotiators were 
committed to the principle of the EMU as a ‘central 
plank in the unification of Europe and to Franco-
German reconciliation as the motor’. 41  Nonetheless 
there was an informal understanding between the 
technocrats of the two finance ministries that it was 
‘better a second-best outcome at our (technically 
competent) level than an “nth-best” solution in the 
hands of heads of state and government and foreign 
ministers’.42 
 
On 1 January 2002, euro notes and coins were 
introduced.   
 
 
Core-Europe and a Franco-German federation 
 
After the Maastricht Treaty which created the 
European Union was signed, a proposal for a ‘Core 
Europe’ (Kerneuropa) was put forward in 1994 by 
Wolfgang Schäuble, then chairman of the CDU/CSU 
group in the Bundestag, in the ‘Schäuble-Lamers Paper’. 
The paper advocated the constitution of a ‘hard-core’ 
of member states within the EU, consisting of the 
original members of the EU but controversially 
excluding Italy. France and Germany would form the de 
facto ‘core of the hard-core’. It warned that the EU was 
in danger of becoming a loose association with fewer 
                                                     
40
 Dyson, Kenneth. 1999. ‘The Franco‐German relationship 
and economic and monetary union: Using Europe to ‘Bind 
Leviathan’. West European Politics, 22:1. 25.   
41
 Ibid. 33.  
42
 Ibid. 26.  
economic aspects for cooperation, as the membership 
of the bloc and the differentiation of interests within it 
expanded. In the wake of the ongoing euro zone 
sovereign debt crises, and with Schäuble himself 
currently serving as the Minister of Finance in the 
German government, the ‘Core Europe’ idea has 
regained traction as that of a ‘two-speed Europe’.  
 
The idea of integrating France and Germany perhaps 
reached its logical end-point in 2003, when the German 
European Commissioner Günter Verheugen and his 
French colleague Pascal Lamy called for a Franco-
German federation – in effect, a unification of the two 
countries – in a joint article published in the Berliner 
Zeitung and Liberation on the 40th anniversary of the 
signing of the Élysée Treaty. 43  They envisaged a 
federation with common governmental institutions, 
pursuing common foreign, security, and financial 
policies. The proposal, however, has not caught on. The 
Franco-German Ministerial Council, however, was set 
up that same year to replace the regular summits of the 
heads of state of France and Germany as designated in 
the Élysée Treaty. 
 
The enlargement of the EU to 27 member states, and 
more importantly, the current debt crisis in the EU, has 
increasingly brought about debates as to whether the 
Franco-German ‘twin engine’ would continue to be the 
driving force for European integration. The Franco-
German ‘engine’ will remain a necessary, but perhaps 
not sufficient, force to bring the EU to its next stage of 
integration. 
 
 
Asia – Comparisons and reflections on Japan’s 
relations with its neighbours and comparisons with 
the Franco-German case 
 
The application of the case of Franco-German 
reconciliation to Japan’s relations with its East Asian 
neighbours is hardly new. Politicians, activists and even 
social media users in China and South Korea have at 
times pointedly asked Japan to ‘learn’ from the German 
experience of Vergangenheitsbewältigung.44 They have 
decried official Japanese statements of apology for its 
wartime conduct as ‘too little too late’.  
 
While the issue of school history textbooks and history 
education between France and Germany have been a 
                                                     
43
 Kirk, Lisbeth. 2003. ‘Verheugen and Lamy propose Franco-
German federation’. EUobsever, 21 January 2003. 
<http://euobserver.com/institutional/9084>   
44
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cornerstone for cooperation and reconciliation, it is 
precisely a bone of contention that continues to 
engender enmity between Japan and its neighbours. 
The revisionist New History Textbook approved by the 
Japanese Ministry of Education in 2001, which 
downplays the history of Japan’s military aggression, 
sparked protests in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
South Korea. For its part, the South Korean 
government-approved history textbook has been 
criticised for not mentioning the atomic bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki at all. Meanwhile Chinese 
textbooks have been criticised for significantly playing 
up the Nanjing massacre in editions from recent years, 
whereas history education in mainland China was 
previously focused on portraying the Nationalist 
Kuomingtang in a bad light.45 
 
The continued visits of Japanese leaders to the 
Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo on key occasions, as of late 
2012, is another polarising act with no equivalent in the 
Franco-German case.  
 
It is to the academic debates that one should turn to for 
better illumination. More balanced and constructive in 
their conclusions than the statements made by 
politicians and activists, these debates have been 
ongoing between Chinese, Japanese and Korean 
scholars.  
 
 
Academic debates 
 
Wu Yikang wrote the seminal Chinese text on Franco-
German reconciliation in 1996.46 Although it does not 
discuss comparisons with East Asia, Wu’s article has 
had the effect of establishing a neo-realist mode of 
analysis in Chinese circles – that it was the calculation 
of national interests between France and Germany 
against the backdrop of the Cold War and a ‘common 
Soviet threat’ that made reconciliation feasible.  
 
While agreeing with a neo-realist reading of the politics 
of reconciliation, the Japanese scholar Toshiro Tanaka 
has also emphasised the issue of improving the public 
image of former enemy states. To this end, Tanaka 
argues for the importance of cultivating friendships and 
exchanges between youths, which was an integral part 
                                                     
45
 Sneider, Daniel. 2012. ‘Divided Memories: History 
Textbooks and the Wars in Asia’. Nippon.com, 29 May 2012. 
<http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00703/>      
46
 Wu, Yikang. 1996. ‘Fade Zhouxin yu Ouzhou Yitihua’ (The 
Franco-German axis and European integration). Ouzhou 
(Europe), No. 1.  
of the Franco-German reconciliation underpinned by 
the Elysee Treaty .47   
 
On the school of thought which believes the case of 
Franco-German reconciliation to be inapplicable to East 
Asia, Jiang Zhou perhaps best sums up the key 
conditions which have been absent in the Sino-
Japanese case:48 
 
1. France and Germany were both weakened after 
World War II; 
2. Franco-German reconciliation was supported by 
the United States and, it might be added, by 
the Cold War policies of the West; 
3. Both France and Germany have shared 
disastrous war experiences over a period of 
time, whereas Jiang presumably believes that 
Japan only shared this experience towards the 
very end of World War II; 
4. There is a greater form of unity between ‘French 
and German civilisations’.   
According to Min Shu, 49  the majority of Japanese 
scholars working on the topic agree that Japan has 
dealt with war responsibility less satisfactorily than 
Germany did. Here, the Japanese scholar Yamaguchi 
proposes four reasons why this was the case:  
 
1. Due to the drastic use of atomic bombs on Japan, 
the Japanese have tended to see themselves as 
victims of the whole war; 
2. The effect and influence of the US occupation of 
Japan – as presumably compared to the 
experience of European integration – had given 
it a very different  domestic environment from 
that of Germany; 
                                                     
47
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3. The long-term dominance of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) in Japanese had 
reduced pressures to address war responsibility 
more deeply, as presumably was the case when 
the Social Democrats won power in Germany in 
the late 1960s; 
4. Post-war economic growth in Japan, in stark 
contrast with the economic situation of 
countries around it, has made the issue of good 
neighbourly relations less important for 
ordinary Japanese.  
Yet other scholars from outside Asia have made 
pointed observations and recommendations.  Jennifer 
Lind has proposed that the ‘Adenauer model’ of 
reconciliation, in which atrocities are acknowledged but 
post-war achievements are emphasised, is more 
workable than the model of Vergangenheits-
bewältigung. In steering away from the public fixation 
on Japan’s inadequacy of remorse, she also suggests 
that real puzzle to be explained ‘is not why Japan 
cannot apologize but why Germany could’.50 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The story of Franco-German reconciliation after 
centuries of rivalry and war is an inspiring one that is 
certainly worthy of study and reflection. One should 
however be cognisant of being naïve in its application. 
To do so would be to overlook the difficulties France 
and Germany have faced in their process of 
reconciliation, and the broader historical and regional 
contexts in which this reconciliation took place. The 
specific historical and regional contexts within which 
Franco-German reconciliation took place must be 
carefully weighed before any ‘lessons’ from Europe 
could be applied to the Asian context. This background 
brief aims to lay the issues out for a timely reappraisal 
of the applicability of the European integration and 
reconciliation processes to East Asia as the latter deals 
with the seeming intractability of historical grievances, 
sovereignty claims and rising nationalism.    
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